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31 January 1962

Proposal for Exchange of Views with Elements of the
JND and JCS in regard to Operations in Denied Areas
within the RUC-1A Area of Responsibility

1. NSC 5412/2 gives the CIA responsibility for covert operations. It also states the types of actions to be conducted in the RUC-1A Area of Responsibility. In accordance with established policies and in the exercise of its authority, the CIA is to be able to areas dominated or controlled by international Communism, to develop underground resistance and to provide covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of these forces in the event of war, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war for stay-behind assets and evasion and escape facilities. In military terminology, this consists of Guerrilla Warfare, Subversion, and Unconventional Resistance).
2. With the advent of the Special Forces and the development of the AVCA and the Air Force, military requirements for CIA in the Army and the Air Force have increased. It would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could participate in the Army's Special Forces program and the Air Force's program of the Special Forces. The Air Force's program of the Special Forces would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could participate in the Air Force's program of the Special Forces.

which, upon the technical facilities, would be prepared to
execute UV plans in support of military operations.

2. In response to Military UV requirements in the past, CIA
articulated four types of assets which it could reasonably be expected to
provide. These are:

a. Action nuclei located where possible within the area
of potential operations, equipped with communications and
supporting facilities, and trained to perform a specific type
of UV task, i.e., Guerrilla Warfare, Training and Education,
or Subversion.

b. One all-purpose asset organizer within each probable
area of operations with communications and the capability to
gather operational intelligence and spot (but not necessarily
recruit) personnel for the requirements in the area.

c. Assets of a supporting character who will be able to
provide limited support to responsible elements of the Armed
Services within the operational area. Such assets are not
capable of undertaking specific UV tasks but can provide local
information, establish contact with the local resistance potential,
or provide safe haven or communications facilities and services.

c. Where pre-war establishment of assets resident in the denied area is not possible, to recruit and train and hold externally selected cadres of agent and action personnel for wartime infiltration into the operational area.

The JCS, after making an assessment of these four kinds of assets, stated their preference for g, h and i assets in that order. With regard to external assets, the JCS consider that for these to be considered effective for Priority I operations (D-Day), they should be held within the theater where they would be readily available.

4. In 1959 the number of VA requirements submitted to the CIA by COMINCEUR totaled 196, of which 89 were for assets in denied areas. Of the denied area requirements CIA accepted 55, three against assets in action and 52 against programmed assets. In 1960 total requirements dropped to 115, of which 58 were in denied areas. Of the latter CIA accepted 28 against current assets and 30 against programmed assets. Of the 38 accepted, 36 were accepted against externally held assets. Only one requirement was accepted against an asset in place in a denied area. Accepts based on programmed assets are of little value for current operational planning unless their programmed readiness date falls within the effective date of the Military Plan (1 July - 30 June). CIA experience in the past has been that in more than 50% of the cases the programmed readiness date was not met. As a result, changes have been made to direct development

program and requirement evaluation procedures which will make it possible to forecast readiness dates with greater certainty.

a. The types of assets which we have informed the military might be developed fall into two broad categories:

(1) Those developed and held within the area of projected operations, and

(2) Those held externally.

Assets to be developed within the area of operations are recognized to be the most desirable types, but the many problems in developing such assets in denied areas are of an order and scope that make their development infeasible. Among the problems are: internal security within the area, maintaining the motivation of the agents, periodic training, the risk of having the asset come under enemy control, and the time, effort and cost which must go into such an effort when there is little likelihood of success and when there are high priority tasks for current operations.

b. The security risks involved in exfiltrating individuals for training are such that this can only be done in very special cases and cannot be counted on as a standard procedure. CIA has not yet found a way to maintain the motivation of individuals in denied areas without frequent contact between the case officer and the asset.

travel restrictions make this almost impossible. Moreover, if an asset is not allowed to "practice" occasionally, he soon grows rusty, on the other hand, if he is allowed to "practice" he risks discovery. Perhaps the most unfavorable factor, and one which we have no sure safeguard against, is the danger of the asset coming under enemy control. The validity of such assets would be unsure. In summary it does not appear feasible for CIA or any other agency to establish UW assets in any meaningful number in denied areas to be held for wartime use.

c. It is therefore proposed that:

a. It is unlikely in the present circumstances that there will be any improvement over past performance in regard to establishment of covert UW assets in denied areas and, recognizing the record of slippage, it is imperative that past performance will be equaled.

b. Priority of effort will be given to the establishing of assets having a current capability. However, plans will be maintained to permit their conversion to wartime missions, including T/W missions when appropriate.

It has been CIA experience, however, that the life span of current assets is uncertain and it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy which

will still be available at the outbreak of hostilities.

2. The development of external assets to be held outside the projected area of operations, either within the U.S. or overseas, will be continued and augmented as required. Major reliance for the fulfillment of SF tasks will be placed on such assets.

Although it is a costly procedure in terms of personnel and money, this solution is practical and has advantages over assets developed and held internally. These are: They are less subject to compromise; they can be trained for the specialty they are to perform; they can, with proper attention to security factors, undertake joint training with military units if such is indicated; and they will be available at the time needed.

With regard to the development of externally held assets, CIA proposes to develop singleton assets or small teams of two or more men who could be infiltrated into the operational area prior to the Special Forces Teams. These assets would be complementary to the Special Forces and would be able to serve as guides and interpreters since they would have fluency in the language and a

knowledge of the area. CIA has undertaken to create a reserve pool of agents and suitable personnel for operations in the denied areas, and at the present time has a small reserve of such individuals in the U.S. These will be available for use with Special Forces or, if such use did not appear imminent, CIA would propose to use them on CIA unilateral missions. CIA is currently expanding its pool of agent assets and reviewing and improving the readiness of existing assets. In addition, plans are being worked out to enable CIA with military support to transport U.S. held agents quickly to the overseas staging areas.

4. CIA will continue to review all current internal assets to determine their varying US potential. The total US requirement will be considered in connection with recruitment of new agents for current use.

The image is a high-contrast, black and white photograph of a textured surface, likely a book cover or endpaper. It features a dense, grid-like pattern of dark and light squares, creating a checkerboard effect. The texture is grainy and noisy, with many small white specks and dark spots. The overall appearance is that of a heavily worn or aged material, possibly leather or a similar synthetic material, with a complex, irregular pattern. The lighting is very harsh, emphasizing the texture and creating deep shadows and bright highlights. The image is oriented horizontally and occupies the entire frame.

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in the event of an emergency. Since it is not possible to maintain their jobs indefinitely, the personnel involved in this program will require from 15-30 days. Because of this delay, these personnel will be considered as meeting D-day requirements for PW operations. On the other hand, assuming the availability of transportation from the U.S., these personnel could do most military requirements for Priority I operations (D-15 days). We, therefore, propose to accept Priority I requirements based on these assets and others that we will develop prior to and following the outbreak of hostilities.

6. Since the recruitment and maintenance of current PW assets in the United States is impractical and since the maintenance of external assets in the Continental United States cannot be considered an adequate response to D-day requirements, we are agreed that some assets must be held at least such assets overseas, reasonably close to the areas of their original assignment. As was pointed out in Paragraph 4 above, we have been able to solve this problem in the Far East but not in Europe. However, the military services, by virtue of their more larger installations and far wider range of activities overseas, may well have a greater possibility to handle this matter than CIA. I would, therefore, propose that we explore with the military services the possibility of creating a joint military-CIA program in Europe for the recruitment, training, and holding of external assets. Such a program, in addition to providing assets available for a wide range of use, would have the further advantage of ensuring in Special Forces elements and full knowledge of the identity, training, and capability of the assets which will support their operations.

7. Your views on this proposal will be welcomed.

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